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NOTES AND COMMENT
that the opinion was arrived at by the use of reasonable care. Im-
munity cannot be purchased by the use of a word or phrase.20
Suppose, however, that the auditor had no knowledge of the
intended use of his balance sheet,21 other than the cognizance that
such statements are often used to obtain loans. Would he, in such
case, be bound to another who has relied on it? Definite knowledge is
wanting. In fact, his balance sheet might never be shown to another.
All he is aware of is a custom of practice that such statements are,
and have been, so used in business. In this case it seems that there
can be no recovery because it cannot be said that he knows the pur-
pose for which it is desired. 22 One could as easily infer that the client
desired it to analyze his business, and since one view can be taken
as readily as the other, proof of actual knowledge would be required.
THOMAS M. McDADE.
THE VALIDITY OF A COVENANT OF INDEMNITY IN AN
ILLEGAL LEASE.
It is an ancient principle of the common law that no cause of
action may be predicated upon an illegal or immoral contract.' While
this may, and often does, result in allowing a culpable person to escape
liability, the theory behind it is not designed to accomplish this result,
but rather to discourage the making of such contracts, by rendering
them futile.
2
Montgomery, Auditing-Theory and Practice (4th ed.), p. 466: "As a
general principle of law, an accountant's responsibility for his certificate is not
affected by the inclusion or omission of the phrase 'in our opinion.' The lan-
guage of an auditor's certificate cannot excuse breach of contract or negligence."
Plender, supra Note 2 at 259; Smith, supra Note 17 at 197.
"In the instant case the jury found that the defendant had actual notice of
the use to which the balance sheet was to be put. This they may have concluded
from the submission of the thirty-two copies of the statement, or from the
auditor's knowledge gleaned from former audits.
Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919).
'Peck v. Burr, 10 N. Y. 294 (1851); Tracy v. Talmage, 14 N. Y. 162
(1856); Saratoga County Savings Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 87 (1870); Knowl-
ton v. Spring Co., 57 N. Y. 534 (1874); Smith v. City of Albany, 61 N. Y. 444
(1875); Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558 (1877) ; Materne
v. Horwitz, 101 N. Y. 469. 5 N. E. 331 (1886) ; Hart v. City Theatres, 215
N. Y. 322, 109 N. E. 497 (1915); Burger v. Koelsch, 77 Hun 44 (N. Y., 5th
Dept., 1894) ; Doherty v. Eckstein Brewing Co.. 198 App. Div. 708, 191 N. Y.
Supp. 59 (1st Dept., 1921); Security Mortgage Co. v. Thompson, 66 Misc.
151, 121 N. Y. Supp. 326 (1910).
'3 Williston, Contracts (1920), sec. 1630.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Lord Mansfield, in a frequently quoted passage, says:
"The principle of public policy is this: Ex dolo inalo non
oritzr actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds
his cause of action upon an unmoral or an illegal act. If from
the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise the cause of action
appears to arise ex turpi causa or the transgression of a posi-
tive law of this country, there the court says he has no right
to be assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes; not for
the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their
aid to such a plaintiff." 3
But the rule that follows from this principle is by no means
universally applied to all contracts tainted with illegality. It is an
equally well-settled general rule that where a covenant contains both
legal and illegal parts, and they can be severed without the destruc-
tion of the whole, "whether the illegality be created by statute or by
the common law, you may reject the bad part and retain the good." 4
This principle has been applied to divers types of cases.!, Typical of
its application is the Iowa case of Conklin v. Silver,6 decided a decade
ago, which involved the leasing of premises for the double purpose
of conducting a restaurant and saloon. After the passing of the
Volstead Act, it was held that leases for the exclusive purpose of
selling liquor were at an end when that Act went into effect, 7 there
being "no distinction in principle on this point between a contract
the execution of which is unlawful at the time it is made * * * and
one where, by a subsequent change of law, further performance of
the contract becomes unlawful." 8
'Supra Note 2; Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341, 343, quoted in sec. 1630.
"Mr. Justice Willes in Pickering v. Ilfracombe Ry. Co. L. Rep., 3 C. P.
250. cited in Central New York Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Averill, 199 N. Y. 128, 92
N. E. 206 (1910).
'Where the Court has separated valid from invalid portions of a statute,
and enforced the valid: Dollar Co. v. Canadian, etc., 220 N. Y. 270, 115 N. E.
711 (1917) ; People v. Beakes Dairy Co., 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115 (1918);
People ex rel. Penn. Gas Co. v. Saxe, 229 N. Y. 446. 123 N. E. 673 (1920);
People ex rel. Alpha P. C. Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48, 132 N. E. 870 (1920).
Where wills have contained both legal and illegal provisions, and the Court
has retained the legal and expunged the illegal: Kalish v. Kalish. 166 N. Y.
368, 59 N. E. 917 (1901); Matter of Homer, 237 N. Y. 489, 143 N. E. 655(1924); Matter of Colegrove. 221 N. Y. 455, 117 N. E. 813 (1917); Matter
of Trevor. 239 N. Y. 6, 147 N. E. 203 (1924); it re Murphy's Will, 213 App.
Div. 319, 210 N. Y. Supp. 531 (2nd Dept., 1925).
See also Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346 (1847) ; Oregon Steam Navigat-
ing Co. v. Windsor, 20 Wall. 64 (U. S.. 1873) (where effect was given to the
legal portion of a contract which also contained a provision in illegal restraint
of trade); Leavitt v. Palmer, 3 N. Y. 19 (1849) (which involved a statute
prohibiting banks from issuing any bill or note unless payable on demand with
interest) ; Conklin v. Silver, infra Note 6.
'187 Iowa 819, 174 N. W. 573 (1919).
'Doherty v. Eckstein Brewing Co.. supra Note 1.
8 Ibid. at 712, 191 N. Y. Supp. at 62.
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But where as in the Conklin case, supra, the use of the premises
was not restricted by the contract to a single purpose, the subsequent"
enactment of prohibitory statutes affecting less than all of the pur-
poses contemplated by the contract did not invalidate the instrument,
and a good cause of action might be predicated thereon.
A cause of action may also be based upon a contract, valid on its
face, which under certain circumstances may not be lawfully per-
formed.9 Speaking of such a lease, which was shown to be impossible
of performance because of an ordinance prohibiting the use of prem-
ises for the sale of intoxicating liquors within a certain distance
from an elementary school, the Court said: 10
"It is a generally accepted rule that when a contract is to
do a thing, which cannot be performed without violation of the
law, it is valid; in the absence, at least, of proof that the inten-
tion of both parties was that the law should be violated. The
construction of a contract should be, when it is possible, in
favor of its legality. Co. Litt. 42, 83, Shore v. Wilson, 9 Clark
& Fin. at 397." 11 (Italics ours.)
And in the case of Raner v. Goldberg, 12 the Court held that a lease of
certain premises to be used as a dance hall was not unlawful, as the
parties did not intend to violate the law, but to use the premises for
that purpose only when the lessee had obtained the necessary license
to conduct such an enterprise. But since the sole use contemplated by
the parties required such license, and it was refused by the public
officer in charge, the lease became illegal, and the plaintiff could not
recover rent paid in advance in the absence of an agreement to that
effect, should the license be refused.
In the recent case of Municipal Metallic Bed Manufacturing
Corporation v. Dobbs,' 3 the plaintiff leased from the defendant cer-
tain premises in Brooklyn, said premises to be used by it for the pur-
pose of manufacturing metal beds and the retail selling of beds, bed-
ding and furniture. The lease contained a provision
"That said landlords warrant that the manufacture of
metal beds under leased premises is not in violation of any
federal, city or state ordinance or statute or any restriction
imposed against such leased premises, and that said landlords
will indemnify said tenant for any loss sustained by said tenant
Shedlinsky v. Budweiser, 163 N. Y. 438, 57 N. E. 620 (1900).
10Ibid. at 439, 57 N. E. at 620.
That contracts should be construed wherever possible in favor of their
legality, see Security Mortgage Co. v. Thompson, supra Note 1; Curtis v.
Gokey, 68 N. Y. 300 (1877); Lorillard v. Clyde, 86 N. Y. 384 (1881); Manson
v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 324, 119 N. E. 559 (1918); Cohen v. Berlin & Jones,
9 App. Div. 425, 41 N. Y. Supp. 345 (1st Dept., 1896).
"244 N. Y. 438, 155 N. E. 497 (1915).
"3253 N. Y. 313, 171 N. E. 75 (1930).
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as a result of the existence of such restriction, ordinance or
statute." 14
There is no implied covenant in a lease that the premises are fit
for the contemplated purpose of the tenant, the general rule of caveat
emptor applying.15
The contemplated use, in the instant case, was in fact contrary
to the Zoning Laws of the City of New York,16 the Building Code
of the Bureau of Buildings, 17 and the charter of the City of New
York,' 8 and the plaintiff was forced to vacate the premises by an
order of a city magistrate, for violation of the law.
In an action brought on the warranty to recover damages sus-
tained by reason of its inability to use the premises for any of the
contemplated purposes of the lease, the trial Court denied a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of legal insufficiency, but was
reversed by the Appellate Division, by a divided court, 19 on the
grounds
(1) that the complaint was based upon an illegal lease, and
hence no recovery could be predicated thereon, and
(2) that the alleged misrepresentations of the law could not
be considered fraudulent, but merely an expression of
opinion in regard thereto.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the com-
plaint stated a cause of action, and the plaintiff could recover on the
warranty.
Stating the general rules cited above, the Court distinguishes this
case from actions brought to recover rent paid on an unlawful lease,
and also from those cases in which it was sought to recover indemnity
for a violation of the law. One cannot indemnify another against the
consequences of his illegal acts, 20 but where the indemnitee has no
knowledge of the illegality of the contemplated acts, he may recover
on a promise to indemnify.21 The distinction is made between
"Ibid. at 315, 171 N. E. at 75.
'
5 Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398 (1874) ; Franklin v. Brown, 118 N. Y. 110,
23 N. E. 126 (1889) ; Daly v. Wise, 132 N. Y. 837 (Mem. Op., 1892) ; Carey v.
Kreizer, 26 Misc. 755, 57 N. Y. Supp. 79 (1899). For exceptions to rule, see(1930) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 132.
'"Amended Building Zone Resolution, City of New York (1924), art. II,
sec. 4, par. a.
" Building Code of the Bureau of Buildings, art. I, sec. b.
" Charter of the City of New York, sec. 719b.
"228 App. Div. 659, 239 N. Y. Supp. 881 (2nd Dept., 1930).
' Burger v. Koelsch, supra Note 1; Knelland Rogers, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
579 (1829).
"Coventry v. Barton. 17 John. 142 (N. Y., 1818); Stone v. Hooker, 9
Cow. 153 (N. Y., 1826); Appleton v. Warbasse, 92 Misc. 42, 155 N. Y.
Supp. 987 (1915); Cf. Jewett Publishing Co. v. Butler, 159 Mass. 517, 34
N. E. 1087 (1893); Peterson v. Chicago Ry. Co., 119 Wis. 197, 96 N. W.
532 (1903) ;
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indemnification against the existence of certain facts, and indemnifi-
cation against the existence of certain laws: in the latter case, prior
knowledge of the law will preclude recovery, while knowledge of the
facts is immaterial thereto. If this were not the rule, it would be a
simple matter to protect oneself from the consequences of one's
illegal acts, and such immunity would incite rather than discourage
unlawfulness.
Contracts of indemnity, where the indemnitee had no knowledge
of illegality, have often been upheld in this and other jurisdictions. 22
An excellent example of this is to be. found in Appleton v. War-
basse, 23 where a recovery was allowed on a contract of indemnity
between an author and publisher, the author agreeing to save harm-
less the publisher from the consequences' of the publication of illegal
or libellous matter, no such unlawful publication being actually
intended by the parties. Here, too, as the Court points out, no viola-
tion of the law was intended by the parties, but "the complaint looks
to compliance with the law rather than non-compliance." 24 The
Court says:
"* * * the covenant or guaranty of indemnity sued on
is not an illegal contract, and it may be enforced without any
violation of lav by the tenant. The fact that the lease may not
lawfully be performed does not make the guaranty illegal. It
stands on its own footing." 25
The root of this principle was authoritatively enunciated over a
century ago. Reviewing the English cases in Armstrong v. Toller,20
Marshall, Ch. J., deduced the rule "that where a contract grows
immediately out of, and is connected with, an illegal or immoral act,
it cannot be enforced. But if the promise is entirely disconnected with
the illegal act, and is founded on a new consideration, it is not affected
by the illegality of the act, although it was known to the party to
whom the promise was made." 27 The Court of Appeals in the
Municipal case puts the contract of indemnity there on the same
footing as if it were entirely disconnected with the lease, which is the
original contract, and as though founded on a different consideration.
Nor is the second ground of the Appellate Division for dismiss-
ing the complaint in this action tenable. The action is not based, as
the Court of Appeals points out, on false representation, but on
'Supra Note 21.
' 92 Misc. 42, 155 N. Y. Supp. 987 (1915). See also Jewett v. Butler,
supra Note 21.
" Supra Note 13 at 318, 171 N. E. at 76.
Ibid. at 316, 171 N. E. at 76.
= 11 Wheat. 258 (U. S., 1826), cited in Leavitt v. Blatchford, 5 Barb. 9(N. Y., 1848).
'Leavitt v. Blatchford, -upra Note 26 at 22.
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express warranty. It is true, as Professor Williston says, 2s that as
a general rule
"A representation of what the' law will or will not permit
to be done is one on which the party to whom it is made has no
right to rely; and if he does so it is his folly, and he cannot
ask the law to relieve him from the consequences. The truth
or falsehood of such a representation can be tested by ordinary
vigilance and attention. It is an opinion in regard to the law,
and is always understood as such." 29
He also suggests that in every case the test to be applied is whether
the reliance of the injured party was justified by the relation between
the parties, or the expert knowledge which the maker of the state-
ment purported to have.30 While it cannot be said, perhaps, that the
landlord in the instant case had "expert knowledge" within the mean-
ing of Professor Williston's proposed test, he has taken it upon him-
self to warrant the existing law applicable to his property, and we
fully agree with the Court's statement that
"There is no implied guaranty that an opinion is sound,
but no reason exists why an express guaranty as to the law
applicable to the facts mnay wzot be nmde." (Italics ours.) 3'
On this aspect of the case, it was urged by the defendant that as
every man is presumed to know the law, the plaintiff had no right to
rely even on an express warranty. Knowing, by presumption, that he
is contravening the law, he cannot be indemnified against the conse-
quences of such an act, within the rule stated above. In answer to
this, the Court says:
"No presumption exists that all men know the law. The
maxim 'a man is presumed to know the law' is a trite, senten-
tious saying, 'by no means universally true.' Ignorance of the
law does not excuse persons so as to exempt them from the
consequences of their acts, such as punishment for criminal
offenses. * * * Speaking broadly, we may say that all per-
sons are treated as if they knew the law in passing on the
character of their acts. In that qualified sense is knowledge of
the law imputed to every one." 32
The maxim has often been applied in many jurisdictions to civil
actions, in which the character of the acts of the parties has not been
Williston, Contracts, supra Note 2, sec. 1495.
-'Fish v. Clelland, 33 Ill. 238, 243 (1864), quoted with approval in Upton
v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, 23 L. ed. 203 (1875).
' Supra Note 28.
nSupra Note 13 at 317, 171 N. E. at 76.
2 Ibid.
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in issue,33 and we venture to state that it has been assumed to be the
law by its practitioners as well as its scholars, however palpable a
legal fiction it has seemed. While it may in some cases be fairly
simple to discover the law applicable to a given state of facts',
no one is more aware than lawyers and judges how difficult it some-
times is to find the law applicable to others, as in the case of titles to
real property, the validity of which are constantly being guaranteed
by Title Companies. The Court, in making this analogy with the
right to occupy a building for factory purposes in New York City,
suggests that thus they may often "guarantee the application of real
estate law to difficult and baffling problems, to be finally settled only
by the courts of last resort." 34
Should the Court decide that the occupation of the assured was
illegal, the maxim would not preclude the plaintiff from recovering
under his contract of insurance. Just as here the landlord warrants
that the contemplated use of his premises is legal, and if illegal he
must answer in damages, so the title company must answer to the
assured if the title it has guaranteed is illegal. Neither can now be
heard to say that since "every man is presumed to know the law,"
the indemnitee had no right to rely on the express warranty of legal-
ity. We submit that this decision of the Court of Appeals is sound
in its refusal to apply an ancient and unwieldy maxim of the law to a
modern commercial problem, and is in accordance with modern
legal tendencies.
ESTHER L. KOPPELMAN.
A LIMITATION OF THE RULE AFFECTING INJURIES ARISING OUT OF
AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
The courts have repeatedly stated that the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law should be construed broadly and liberally 1 because it is
the expression of what was regarded by the Legislature as a wise
public policy concerning injured employees.2 The Law was adopted
' North Birmingham St. Ry. Co. v. Calderwood, 89 Ala. 247, 7 So. 360
(1890); Central R. & B. Co. v. Brunswick R. Co., 87 Ga. 386, 13 S. E. 520(1891); Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593 (1857); Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend.
99, N. Y. (1833) ; Hope v. Alton, 214 Ill. 102, 73 N. E. 406 (1905) ; Burger
v. Koelsch, mtpra Note 1; Markowitz v. Arrow Cons. Co., 102 Misc. 532, 169
N. Y. Supp. 159 (1918); Rockwell v. Eiler's Music House, 67 Wash. 478(1912) ; Anson, Contracts (6th ed., 1907), 260.
" Supra Note 13 at 317, 171 N. E. at 76.
1Matter of Petrie, 215 N. Y. 335, 109 N. E. 549 (1915) ; Costello v.
Taylor, 217 N. Y. 179, 111 N. E. 755 (1916); Winfield v. N. Y. C. &.H. R. R.
Co., 216 N. Y. 284, 110 N. E. 614 (1915) ; Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co.,
217 N. Y. 627, 111 N. E. 1097 (1916).
'Matter of Petrie, mipra Note 1.
